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ABS TRACT:  The 199 1 demise of the So viet U nion that led to the emancipation of 
man y Central As ian states, also led to a grab for p ower b y a variety of leadership types.
Although the ch aracteristics of leaders hip ty pes in the 1 990s w ere diverse, few f ollowed
the pattern of Samuel Hun tingto ns Th ird Wave of author itarian tran sition , wher eby
authoritarian r egimes were abando ned in favor of democratically elected and 
dem ocratically oriented gov ernmen ts. Historically, Eurasia has had little experience with
pop ular g overnm ent.  This is reflected in the gener al character istics of leadersh ip typ es in
the post- Soviet era, which closely follow thr ee reg ional histor ical influen ces  the early
Islamic Emperor s, the Mongo lian K hans and the Russian Tsars (an d later Soviet
leaders).  This article examines the historic influ ences on Eur asian leader ship types and
the impact of these types o n the politics, so cieties and econom ies of these same states .  It
will be argued that at the curren t stag e of p olitical dev elopment, it would ultim ately
ben efit the states of Centr al Asia to f ollow, at th is tim e, the most succes sful Eurasian
mod el to date, that o f Kem al Atatürk an d Turk ey, rather than to push for a fully
par ticipatory d emocracy or sustain the post-S oviet person al dictators hips that have
pro spered throu ghout Central Asia.
Keywords:  Central Asia, democratic transition, Kemalism, leadership models.
ÖZET: Sov yetler Birliğin in çök üşü Or ta Asy ada b ir çok yeni devletin ortaya
çõk masõna ve çeşitli yönetim modellerin in olu şmasõn a neden olmu ştur. 1990lar son rasõ
yön etim m odelleri çeş itlilik göstermesine rağ men bu nlardan çok az bir kõsmõ Samuel
Hun tingto nõn o toriter rejimlerin dönüş ümünde Üçüncü Dalg a olar ak adlandõrd õğõ yo lu
izlemiştir. Bu tez, d emokratik sistemler ve d emokratik yo llarla seçilmiş hü kümetlerin
oto riter rejimlere her zaman tercih edileceğini sav unmaktadõr. Ancak, tarih sel olarak
bak õldõğõnda Av rasya bölges inde s eçimle gelen hüküm etlere ilişk in den eyimin çok az
old uğu gö rülmek tedir. Bu du rum So vyetler Birliğinin yõkõlmasõ sonras õndaki yönetim
mod ellerinin özelliklerinde de gö zlenmektedir . Söz konusu yönetim mod elleri esasen üç
tar ihsel dönemin etkilerinin sonu cunda ortaya çõkmõştõr. Bunlar İslam impar atorlarõ,
Moğ ol Han larõ v e Rus Çarlar õnõn ( ve dah a sonr aki So vyet liderlerinin) dönem leridir. Bu
çalõşmada, Avrasya yö netim modellerinin tarih sel etkileri incelenmekte ve b unlarõn söz
kon usu bö lge ülkelerindeki siyasete, to pluma ve eko nomik yapõlara ne şekild e yans õdõğõ
tar tõşõlm aktadõr. Bu çerçev ede, h alihazõrdaki siyas i gelişim seviyeleri çer çevesinde sö z
kon usu ülkelerin, gün ümüze kadar görülen en b aşarõlõ Avrasya mo deli o lan Tü rkiye yi
ve Kemal Atatür kü ör nek almalarõnõn, tam katõlõmcõ demok rasiye geçiş veya Sovyetler
son rasõ d iktatö rlük r ejimleri alternatiflerin e göre çok d aha yararlõ olacağ õ belirtilmektedir .
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Orta Asya, demokratik dönüşüm, Kemalizm, liderlik
modelleri.
                                                 
∗ This article is based on a paper presented at the 17th Middle East History and Theory
(MEHAT) Conference, University of Chicago, May, 2002.
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Introduction
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events brought a spotlight to bear on the
states of Central Asia.  This light focused not just on Afghanistan, which had
become a breeding ground for terrorism and instability, but on the rest of the region,
as well.  It seemed as if the West had just become aware that a region of the world
that for the most part had been controlled by the Soviet government in Moscow for
seven decades was now independent and in need of attention.  This closer
examination exposed the world to the reality that few of the states in this region had
followed the pattern of Samuel Huntingtons Third Wave of democratic transition,
whereby authoritarian regimes were abandoned in favor of democratically elected
and democratically oriented governments. The increased scrutiny of Central Asia
made it painfully obvious that the democratic transition from Soviet rule, as
documented by Prof. Huntington, had not penetrated the hinterland of Eurasia
(Huntington, 1993).  While this had been known by both scholars with research
interests in the area and policy makers with agendas to keep, the World Trade
Center and Pentagon attacks revealed that this lack of democratic institution
building was cause for alarm now that the restraints of bipolarity were no longer in
place.
Of the seven states that make up Central Asia (narrowly defined), five are former
Soviet Republics and all are predominantly Muslim.  If the Caucasian republics are
included as well, three more newly independent states complicate the math with two
predominantly Christian countries and one more Muslim state.  At the time of the
Soviet collapse, Pakistan was the only country of Central Asia with a democratically
elected government, while the other non-Soviet state, Afghanistan, was entrenched
in civil war.  The Soviet collapse created a power vacuum in the remaining states
that was quickly filled by those with access to the instruments of power, namely
control of the military and government apparatuses.  Those who took power
following the disintegration of the USSR established regimes that generally reflected
the historical influences on leadership roles that were common to the region,
however much they espoused doctrines of democracy.  The general characteristics of
leadership types (and the resulting styles of government) in these post-Soviet states
of Eurasia closely followed three regional historical influences  those of the early
Islamic Emperors, the Mongolian Khans, and the Russian Tsars (and later Soviet
leaders), which will be discussed shortly.
Why Discuss Leadership Types?
The recent events in Afghanistan, namely the American-led efforts that displaced the
Taliban regime, have raised numerous questions about the type of leadership needed
to bring stability not only to Afghanistan but to Eurasia as a whole.  The implied
assumption, of course, is that by providing these states with strong and legitimate
leadership, Eurasia can be brought into the international community as an important
contributing region, and not a part of the globe that fosters terrorism, instability and
backwardness.  Add to this the more practical desire of exploiting the vast natural
resources located within a number of Central Asian states, and discussions of regime
stability and accessibility take on a greater importance.
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This paper argues that at the current stage of political development, it would
ultimately benefit the states of Central Asia to follow, at this time, the most
successful Eurasian leadership (and subsequent institutional) model to date, that of
Kemal Atatürk and Turkey, rather than to push for a fully participatory democracy
or sustain the post-Soviet personal dictatorships that have prospered throughout
Central Asia.  By creating systems of government that develop sustained economic
growth and graduals moves towards fuller democracy, leaders in Central Asia will
encourage foreign investment and trade, modernization and economic development,
and establish an historical legacy which is often the unspoken goal of all leaders.
The first section of this article briefly recounts the current status of the Central Asian
states and their post-Soviet leadership histories.  The second section examines the
historical models that have influenced leaders and leadership styles in Eurasia.  The
third section considers the Kemalist model, identifying both its strengths and
weaknesses.  Finally, the conclusion suggests reasons for and ways in which the
states of Central Asia can adapt the Kemalist model to their own particular systems.
Post-1991
The 1991 demise of the Soviet Union that led to the emancipation of most of the
states of Central Asia, also led to a grab for power by those with a vested interest in
maintaining power.   Of the eight former republics in the region (five from Central
Asia and three from the Caucasus) all but three have the same leader as at the time
of the Soviet collapse, and of those three that differ, two have leaders (presidents in
each case) that represent the same party or authority as at the time of transition.
Only Tajikistan has had a different leader and this is due mainly to the internecine
conflict that wracked the country for five years in the mid-1990s.  From Nursultan
Nazerbayev in Kazahkstan to Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan to Heydar Aliyev in
Azerbaijan, Central Asian heads of state in the post-Soviet era have for the most part
followed in the steps of a number of historic figures by establishing regimes based
on personal and military power, coercion and terror, and control of the economy and
the creation of dynastic systems of government.  Following are brief political
biographies of each Eurasian state during the previous decade (see Karatnycky, et.
al., 1997;  Bremmer and Taras, 1997;  Brown, 1990;  The CIA World Factbook,
2002; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2002 for complete cited material).
Armenia.  In September of 1991, Armenian independence was approved by popular
referendum.  Lev Ter-Petrosyyan, the former parliamentary chairman was elected
president with 83 percent of the vote.  From 1991 until 1995, Armenia operated
under much the same form of constitution that it had inherited from the Soviet era.
In July of 1995, a new constitution was adopted, one that was highly criticized by
opposition parties for shifting power away from the legislative body to the office of
the President.  That same month, elections were held for the National Assembly,
with the largest opposition party banned by the Ter-Petrosyyan controlled Central
Election Commission.  Ter-Petrosyyans Republican Party won the greatest majority
of seats, allowing him to govern nearly unhindered until the next presidential
elections of 1998.  In these elections, Ter-Petrosyyans ally Robert Kocharian (the
former President of Nagorno-Karabakh), was elected president with nearly 60% of
the vote.  In parliamentary elections the following year, Kocharians Republican led
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Unity Bloc captured 46% of the vote.  Since 1999, the Kocharian Unity Bloc has
dominated the politics of Armenia.
Azerbaijan.  Azeri independence was declared in August, 1991.  In September of
that year, Ayaz Mutalibov, First Party Secretary, was elected President.  After
several chaotic years of political turmoil (mostly associated with Nagorno-
Karabakh), the ouster of Mutalibov, and the reinstatement of the Supreme Soviet,
Heidar Aliyev, the former First Party Secretary purged by Mikhail Gorbachev, was
elected president in October 1993 with 98.8% of the vote.  Aliyev was re-elected in
October 1998 with 78% of the popular vote. As with the previous election,
international observers declared this election to be undemocratic.  In November
2000, Aliyevs New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) and its allies captured 86% of the seats
in the parliament.  While Aliyev remains in firm control, his age (79 years) has
lessened his authority to a certain extent.
Georgia.  In the late 1980s, Georgia faced strong nationalist challenges from the
constituent components of Georgia (proper), Abkhazia, and Southern Ossetia.  Most
of the smaller regions of the Soviet republic (15 total) had significant minority
populations (primarily Armenian Azeri, and Ossetian) that chose to support the
state.  The largest group of the fractured Nationalist movement was led by Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, whose Round Table-Free Georgia bloc won 54% of the vote in the
parliamentary elections of October 1990.  By March 1991, Georgia had declared its
independence from the Soviet Union and Gamsakhurdia was elected president in
May of the same year, with 87% of the vote.  Of note is the fact that Abkhazia and
Southern Ossetia did not participate in this election.  Gamsakhurdia quickly adopted
an authoritarian model of government that favored ethnic Georgians.  This naturally
led to increased violence by minority groups and the eventual ouster of
Gamsakhurdia in March 1992, when power was transferred to the government of
Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister.  From 1992 until 1995
Shevardnadze essentially led his country in a civil war, not cementing his hold on
power until the reported death of Gamsakhurdia in early 1994, and Shevardnadzes
election as President in late 1995.   In April 2000, Shevardnadze was returned to the
office of President with electoral support of 80%.  His Citizens Union of Georgia
(CUG) won 42% of the seats in parliamentary elections.  Since mid-2000,
Shevardnadze has managed to keep ethnic tensions below the boiling point, while at
the same time attempting to diversify the power of the government.
Kazakhstan.  As with many of the former republics, Kazakhstan voted to remain in
the Soviet Union after the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991.
However, as the collapse of the USSR became imminent, Kazakhstan declared
independence in December 1991, one week after having elected Nursultan
Nazarbayev (the First Party Secretary and Supreme Soviet President) President of
Kazakhstan with 98% of the vote.  Nazerbayev quickly forged close ties with the
Russian Federation and used his influence with Yeltsin to strengthen his personal
position at home.  In 1994 and 1995 Nazarbayev faced trouble from the independent
Constitutional Court over irregularities discovered by international observers in the
1994 parliamentary elections.  However, the parliament (composed of a majority of
Nazarbayev supporters) turned aside the trouble, further increasing Nazarbayevs
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hold on power.  In January 1999 Nazerbayev was again returned to office by a
landslide victory (81%), and continues to dominate the political scene.
Kyrgyzstan.  In August 1991 the Kyrgyz Republic declared its independence from
the Soviet Union.  Two months later Askar Akayev (the former president of the
republic) was elected President in uncontested elections, receiving over 95% of the
vote. In 1993, a new constitution was introduced and Akayev again ran for office in
1995.  Once more elected to office, Akayev worked to further consolidate his power.
Relative stability in the country, and an uncanny ability to pin difficulties on
political fall guys, helped Akayev to retain his popularity, allowing him to be elected
a third time in October 2000, with 74% of the vote.
Tajikistan. In the several years before Tajik independence was declared (late 1991),
the political arena of Tajikistan had been troubled by conflict between communists,
nationalists, and Islamic reformists.  A series of leaders and three new governments
lead to a fierce civil war that finally ended in 1997.  The president for much of the
civil war, Emomali Rakhmonov, had been elected in 1994 as part of the agreement
intended to end the war.  He was again elected in November of 1999 with 97% of
the vote.  His party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) won 60%
of the seats in the parliamentary elections that same year.  While Rakhmonovs party
dominates the political arena of Tajikistan, significant inroads have been made by
opposition groups.
Turkmenistan.  In August of 1990, the Turkmen Supreme Soviet declared
independence.  One month later, Saparmurat Niyazov, the Communist Party First
Secretary, was elected president with 98% of the vote in an uncontested election.  In
1999 he was declared President for Life, and now governs the country as an absolute
dictator.  While there is a parliament, all members are subject to Niyazovs approval,
and must be a member of his Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT).
Uzbekistan.  As late as March 1991, the vast majority of Uzbek citizens voted to
remain in the Soviet Union.  The Unions demise later that year led to a round of
presidential elections, which were won by Islom Karimov, the former First Party
Secretary, with 86% of the vote.  In March 1995, Karimovs term was extended until
2000, at which time elections were again held.  Karimov once more emerged
victorious, this time receiving 92% of the popular vote.  The decade of Karimovs
rule has been characterized by increased centralization of power, accusations of
human rights violations, strong arm tactics and the suppression of political
opposition.  Since December 1999, Karimov has had a parliament, the Supreme
Assembly (Oliy Majlis), where all parties (and all parliamentarians) have declared
support for his government.
Some scholars may argue that the leaders in each of these states had little choice in
the political systems they established.  The death of the Soviet Union was something
of a surprise, and while there had been deep internal divisions, few people, in the
East or the West, thought the end result would be the implosion of the USSR.  Under
such circumstances it is only natural that the likes of Akayev, Karimov, and
Nazerbayev filled the power vacuum.  After all, they were the individuals with the
experience to govern the newly independent states and in positions that allowed
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them to take advantage of the situation.  It is, as some have argued, simply a matter
of misfortune that the only system of government they knew how to lead was one
based on authoritarian rather than democratic principles.  As Richard Rose, William
Mishler and Christian Haerpfer have noted:
The collapse of communist power meant that [former republics] were forced to
create [new governments] at short notice and in unexpected circumstances.  It is
unrealistic to expect the choices made to produce an ideal democracy. (Rose,
et.al., 1994: 43)
It is my contention that it was not only the circumstances of the collapse of the
Soviet Union that led the leaders of these states to adopt authoritarian systems of
government.  It was, in fact, due to the long existing historical influences of
leadership in the region and not just the suddenness of the transition that compelled
leaders to install governments based on the systems with which they were familiar.
Historic Leadership Models
Historically, Eurasia has had little experience with popular government.  Prior to the
Mongol invasion of the late 13th Century, tribal systems of government, themselves
predominantly patriarchal, were the norm for the pastoral peoples of Central Asia.
Eventually replaced by foreign systems of government, the peoples of Eurasia lived
under foreign control for nearly eight centuries.  The collapse of the Soviet system
of government provided the first sustained opportunity for self rule and the
development of democracy.  However, the tendency in the post Soviet era, as seen
above, has been towards centralized authoritarian rule rather than democratically
oriented systems of government.  The historic precedents for authoritarian rule in the
region are numerous.  Until the 13th Century, Central Asia was primarily the domain
of numerous tribes of wandering nomads, who split their time between herding and
warring with other tribes.  The southern parts of Eurasia (Ghazna, Khorasan, Persia,
and Anatolia) had been under the domination of a variety of Islamic empires since
the 8th Century, most notably those of Salah al-Din and of the Abbasids, and later
the Seljuks.  Beginning in the 13th Century, Chingiz (Genghis) Khan, Timur Lang,
Bohdan Khmelntsky (the Ukrainian Cossack leader), the Tsarist conquerors of the
17th through 19th centuries, to name a few, organized all or parts of Central Asia
under authoritarian regimes essentially based on the sets of principals described
above.  Some systems, for example those of Timur Lang and Khmelntsky, lasted for
only a few years, while the Islamic, Mongolian and Tsarist influences remained for
hundreds of years.  All systems, regardless of origin, contained the same basic
elements of government:  a reliance on militarism and terror for maintaining order
and control, hereditary accession based on some God-given right of rule, and a
distinct demarcation between the governors and the governed.
Eastern Influences.  The influences on the states of Central Asia from the East
require little explanation.  These influences almost exclusively represent the story of
the expansion of the Mongol Empire (first by Chengiz Khan, a title of the leader
Temujin meaning Universal Chief), and its later conversion to a Chinese Empire.
In 1219, Chengiz Khan swept out of the East to attack the Muslim regimes
governing Persia and Transoxiana. He united much of the Eurasian landmass under
his rule, bringing together the sedentary peoples of the region with their nomadic
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brethren.  Khans mandate of One sun in Heaven, one lord on Earth firmly
established the power relationship that was to exist between the leader and the
people under Mongol rule (Kishlansky, et.al., 1995: 445) and his use of terror tactics
to force reluctant or recalcitrant populations into submission became the de rigueur
practice of future leaders of the region.
The death of Chingiz Khan did not end the harsh, despotic rule of Eurasia by the
Mongols.  His successors continued his policies of war, conquer and expansion until
only the periphery of Eurasia (Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Japan) remained
outside direct Mongol influence.  By 1243, the Mongols had invaded western Iran,
Armenia, Georgia, and northern Mesopotamia, while defeating the Seljuk rulers of
Anatolia, and finally stopping with the defeat and death of the Abbasid caliph, al-
Mustasim (Lewis, 1996: 96-97).  According to Bernard Lewis, this Mongol defeat
of the Caliphate ended an era in Islamic civilization by reifying the power of a single
leader  in this case the Mongolian Khan  that later influenced the rulers of the
various empires of Eurasia and the Middle East (Lewis, 1996: 97).
Northern Influences.  Like the eastern influences on leadership, northern influences
were fairly simple and straightforward.  The model originated with the Czars of the
16th Century, who had styled their pattern of leadership partially from their
experiences with the Mongol overlords of the previous centuries, and partially from
the influences of Christian Europe.  Due to a number of complimentary factors
(principle among them geography), the peoples of Russia, and later the Soviet
Union, had developed a tendency to seek government protection at the hands of the
strongest and most despotic leaders, even prior to the invasion of the Golden Horde.
In addition to geography, culture and material wealth also played a role in the
establishment of a powerful, authoritarian tradition in the lands of Russia.
The open spaces of Russian territory that extended across the plains of Central Asia
to the steppes of western China were an invitation from the East for invasion and
presented great difficulty in providing protection for the peoples of Russia.  Due to
the sheer size of the Empire, it was physically impossible to monitor and defend
every access point from invaders.  The great diversity of cultures living under
Moscows rule also precluded more democratically oriented rule, as strong leaders
were better able to encourage the cooperation of its people and mobilize forces to
stand up to the intruders.  As Geoffrey Hosking notes, the improvisation of political
structures during times of urgency and adversity tended to favor personal power
relationships in the form of patron-client interactions (first in the druzhina and
kormlenie in Kievan Rus and the Muscovite Principality, later in the institution of
serfdom in imperial Russia and the nomenklatura system of the Soviet Union)
(Hosking, 2001: 7).
The lack of material resources (and subsequent lack of wealth) of the common
Russian further increased their dependence on those who could offer them the
protection they could not otherwise afford (Almond and Powell, 1996: 428-429).  In
all forms (whether Kievan, Muscovite, or Imperial), Russian societies have been
poor, with the ownership of wealth concentrated in few hands, and the rest to fend as
communities as best they could.  The inability of even the local elite to raise funds to
pay for protection, as their European counterparts did, meant a reliance on those
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who had the wealth to offer their protection.  This exploitation was further
reinforced with the collusion of the Russian Orthodox Church who, in need of the
same patronage as the Russian masses, supported the strengthening of the patriarchic
aspects of Russian society and culture.  As the Russian Empire expanded into
Central Asia after the retreat the Asian overlords in the 16th Century, this system of
authoritarian rule was brought with them and found fertile ground on the windswept
plains of Eurasia.
Southern Influences.  Southern leadership influences on the region of Central Asia
were the most complex of the three.  Not just because the extent of the influences
varied from leader to leader, but also because Islam played such an important role in
what type of leadership existed.  Islam is as much a philosophy of government as it
is a philosophy of life and established strong, multi-directional influences (the
religion, the culture, the history) on Middle Eastern leaders.  The primary tenet of
Islam, however, being submission to the will of Allah, (Goldschmidt, Jr., 1988: 43)
this had a deep impact on the source and style of leadership within the growing
Islamic world.  Characteristically, the rulers of Islamic regimes were strong military
despots, segregated from their people (the raaya or the flocks), and dependent
upon enslaved soldiers to enforce their will (Kishlansky, et. al., 1995: 443).  Much
of these traditions had first been learned from the encounters Muslims had with the
Sasanids of Iran in the early 7th Century and reinforced as the ummah (the
community of the followers of Mohammed) grew larger and more powerful.
Yet despite the centralizing tendencies of Islam, the Muslim world was by no means
unified under a single system of government.  Soon after the death of the Prophet,
the ummah split into two factions, each favoring a different heir to Mohammeds
seat of power.  This conflict of Sunni vs. Shiite was further compounded by the
numerous political dynasties that were to spring up across the Muslim world.  From
the Umayyads in Syria to the Mamluks in Egypt and the Ottomans in Anatolia, the
Muslim lands were inundated by a plethora of empires over a 1,200 year period.
Extending from India to Morocco and Hungary to Sudan, no less than 32 Islamic
dynasties existed during this time, several of which had competing claims to the
Caliphate (Goldschmidt, Jr., 1988: 373-384).  Yet, the one characteristic that nearly
all of these kingdoms shared was authoritarian (and mostly despotic) leadership
based on the primacy of Islam in the culture.  As much of the southern part of
Central Asia came under Islamic control, these leadership tendencies were
transferred to the region.
The Kemalist Model
Given the historical influences on leadership in the states of Eurasia, why then can it
be suggested that the system of government, and the pattern of leadership,
established by Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s represents the best model for Central
Asian leaders to utilize in bringing their states into the international community and
completing their post-communist transition phase?  Atatürk was very much set on
establishing a western-oriented system of government, and had a strong aversion to
the traditional politics that he had witnessed at the court of the Sultan.  He saw the
history of the Ottoman Empire as an anchor weighing down the development of
Turkey, and worked diligently to rid Turkey of its historical reliance on tradition,
culture and religion, all of which remain strong elements (and at times tools) in the
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states of Central Asia today.  What then is the justification for suggesting a Kemalist
model, which appears to run counter to the natural historical tendencies of Eurasia?
The reasons are fairly simple.  First, what many of the countries of Central Asia are
experiencing today  the uncertainty brought about by the collapse of the only
government (and an empire at that) most citizens have ever known, the efforts to
join the international community on equal footing, the pull of historical
circumstances, the influence of Islam  these have all been part of the Turkish
experience at the time of Turkeys formation.   What most of the Eurasia states are
now suffering through, Turkey has had first hand experience with, and has survived
more or less intact, thanks in great part to Atatürk and his established model of
government.  Second, Turkey has close cultural ties with the region of Central Asia.
At the least, we can see that if it is applied correctly, the Kemalist model does have
the possibility of meshing well with the political and social culture of the peoples of
Central Asia.  Third, the Kemalist model, as is discussed below, is not so much
about establishing democracy, but preparing the groundwork for the growth of
democratic tendencies.  The Kemalist model does not presume that citizens know
what democracy is, have a sense of civil society or are inclined towards democratic
behavior.  As Lord Kinross has noted, Atatürk himself was a conflicted individual
with his Occidental outlook and Oriental habits (Kinross, 1995: 32).  Yet he
understood the long-term need for democratic progression and development and thus
established a state that, for all of its flaws, is centered on democratic principles and
evolutionary growth of democratic behavior.
What exactly then is the Kemalist model?  In 1923, Kemal Atatürk founded the new
Republic of Turkey from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire.  Much like the
Soviet Union seven decades later, the Ottoman Empire had collapsed as a result of
internal social distress, external pressures and ineffective government.  The
complexity of problems facing Atatürk forced him to adopt a loosely structured
doctrine of development, one that could avoid the pitfalls of ideology (which
Atatürk distained), yet provide a cohesive program for the citizens of this new state
to follow.  These guiding principles of the new Turkish state came to be known by
1931 as the Six Arrows of Kemalism, and were represented on the banner of the
Republican Peoples Party (CHP), the party of Atatürk (Kinross, 1995: 457).
Republicanism, populism, nationalism, and secularism were the first of the arrows
of Kemalism.  They were introduced at a time when Atatürk was attempting to build
support for his newly founded republic.  Elements within Turkish society were
inclined to favor the past system of government over the radical new form
introduced by Atatürk.  The Gazi had to further contend with a significant foreign
presence on Turkish soil (primarily Greek, French, Italian and British).  These first
four principles of Kemalism brought the people of Turkey together by asserting
several new notions that were easily linked:  the idea of a Turkish people, with their
own land (nationalism), who can participate in the governing of the country
(populism) and have a voice in its direction (republicanism) (Kramer, 2000: 8).
As the republican model met stronger reaction from the more traditional elements of
Turkish society, Atatürk introduced his fifth and six principles, those of revolution
and statism.  The former principle (nowadays translated as reformism) was
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intended to instill into the people a living sense of the democratic revolution that
Atatürk had initiated, much as was done in Mexico in 1921 under the Institutional
Revolutionary Party of the so-called Sonoran Dynasty.  The latter principle was
introduced as a means of guiding the economic development of Turkey that Atatürk
knew would be followed by liberalized social mores.
At times, Atatürk had need to operate in a heavy handed manner, one that violated
most of the principles of democratic government, but was allowed (to a certain
extent) within the structure of Kemalism, as any deviance from the six principles
stood in need of correction.  As Atatürk was the president, and as the principles of
Kemalism were open to interpretation, corrective measures that did seem to go
against the notion of democracy were found acceptable within this context.
Essentially Atatürk used authoritarian methods to achieve his goals  which were
democratically oriented.  He was looking at the Big Picture and understood that if
Turkey wanted to achieve the level of development of the Western powers, the
people needed to be coerced occasionally into acting properly (Kramer, 2000: 7).
The ultimate goal of Kemalism was really to teach the people how to govern
themselves, based on democratic means and free from the chains of the past.
Kemalism emphatically was not liberal nor inherently democratic.  It was tool used
by a father to educate his children and to create a stable homelife where, when
adulthood had been achieved, democracy and modernity would reign.
The Weaknesses of Kemalism
For all the benefits that Kemalism provided for the Turkish state, in the 70 years
since its inception, Kemalism has foundered due to certain weaknesses in the
doctrine.  One of the main problems is that Kemalism itself is a transitional ideology
on which to model government that was based on the state of the world in the 1920s.
These basic principles that Atatürk introduced were intended to strengthen a nascent
Turkish state, not to become the permanent mantra of a heavy-handed government.
They were created as functional tools for the period, not as substitutes for the natural
development of popular government (Kramer, 2000: 1).  Many of the challenges that
Atatürk feared would tear apart the country he had worked so hard to create, now no
longer exist.  The communist threat has vanished, the notion that European powers
wanted to dissect Turkey no longer holds water (although some may argue that the
process of globalization and the involvement of the IMF in Turkish affairs are
simply a 21st Century version of the Capitulations which played such a devastating
role on the economy and the psyche of Turkey), and Turks now appreciate, to a
certain extent, the idea of democratic rule and popular participation in government.
While it is true that Islamic fundamentalism has been on the rise in Turkey, this
should be understood more in the context of democratic development than
reactionary reversal.
A second problem that has been attached to Kemalism is its openness to
interpretation.  As an example, right-wing nationalists cite his pride in Turkeys
ancestry as a call for pan-Turkism, while socialists see his placing the state at the
head of the economy as a sign of his leftist tendencies (Pope, 1997: 67).   Those who
followed Atatürk as the leaders of the Turkish government were able to use the
intentional ambiguity of the Kemalist principles to justify almost any unpopular
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action, the most obvious of which are the several military coups that Turkey has
experienced over the last 40 years.
Finally, a lasting problem that has no real solution rests on the fact that Kemalism
forced democratic development on the people of Turkey, many of whom were
uncomfortable with the clash between modern (and Western) democratic values and
those traditional values associated with a Muslim society.  Democracy works best
when it is developed at the grass roots and grows to encompass a political system.
Atatürk understood this, but he also understood that the people of Turkey needed
help in developing democratic tendencies.  Thus, when the people balked at the
actions of the government, Atatürk forced the issue, essentially letting his people
know that they would become democratic and like it, or else.  Unfortunately,
Atatürk died at a stage of development that tended to emphasize the authoritarian
aspects of Kemalism rather than the populist features.  Thus, those who followed in
his giant footsteps (most notably Ismet Inönü) were guided by a false (and
incomplete) representation of the path that Atatürk had intended.
The Future of Central Asia
While it took the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 for the world to notice
Central Asia, hopefully such another clarion call will not be needed to ensure the
continued participation of developed countries in completing the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy that is self-sustaining and viable.  The ability of
leaders in the great number of Eurasian states, particularly those of strict
authoritarian bearing, to recognize the benefits of the Kemalist model is certainly
and obviously not an easy task.   And the model itself must be handled with care or
many of the same failures that plague Turkey today could emerge at this important
stage of transition.  The Kemalist model is by no means perfect, but it does offer
guidelines that can be used in an area of the world with similar, albeit lengthier,
historical tendencies.
States such as Azerbaijan, with the elderly Heydar Aliyev, Turkmenistan, where
Saparmurat Niyazov governs as an absolute dictator, and Uzbekistan, where the
strong arm political style of Islom Karimov holds sway, will be hard pressed to
adopt the Kemalist model.  They have been entrenched in their systems of
government for too long and their leaders are too old to readily contemplate such
dramatic change.  Aliyev, Karimov, and Niyazov are all too aware of the Pandoras
Box which may be opened should they introduce more liberal policies, and are
unlikely to fiddle with the mechanisms of their governments.
For Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan there is greater hope, as both leaders in these states
are younger and moderately more progressive than their peers.  Nursultan
Nazarbayev, who has governed since the Gorbachev era, is young enough (born in
1940) to adjust his methods of government and old enough to be concerned about
his historical legacy.  Much the same can be said for Askar Akayev (born 1944), the
President of Kyrgystan.  Although he was a new comer to the political field (having
been the former head of the Academy of Sciences), he has quickly built a following
for himself and remains quite popular.  Nazarbayev, while representing the old
Soviet school if government, was also a late entry into the system and is considered
a benevolent contemporary dictator.  By guaranteeing elections free from the taint of
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corruption, by bringing together the two main ethnic groups (Kazakhs and Russian),
and by opening up the political process, Nazarbayev can guide the people of
Kazakhstan towards eventual democracy.  Akayev, too, must deal more openly with
his constituency, ending the activities that typify authoritarian rule, which in his case
means primarily tinkering with the constitution and creating political infighting to
weaken prospective opponents.  By strengthening the trust of the people in the
system of government, both Akayev and Nazarbayev can move their states towards
more open and representative democracy.
Both Georgia and Tajikistan have had difficulty with open civil conflict.  Neither
state has a leader that is particularly good at creating a sustained peace, although
Eduard Shevardnadnze has significant prestige in the international community that,
if better utilized, could lead to the involvement of foreign states in assisting Georgia
during this time of trouble.  The first step necessary for each of these states is
constructing a concept of identity that can include all segments of each of these
societies.  The excesses of the 1980 Turkish revolution and its aftermath aside, one
strength of the Kemalist model was that the principle of nationalism created an
image of the Turk that was worthy of a people with such a long history and such a
rich culture.  Circassians, Laz, and even Kurds identify very much with being a Turk
and being Turkish.   If the leadership of both Georgia and Tajikistan could create
an identity of their peoples that was inclusive rather than exclusive then the
foundations would be built for construction of a state where civil conflict would not
be a concern.
Of the Central Asian states discussed in this paper, only Armenia seems poised to
make a leap to the Kemalist model.  Robert Kocharians succession to the
Presidency in in 1998 brought new leadership to power that has the benefit of a
strong political machine behind it, and significant support from the population (even
with factoring in voter fraud).  As a country, Armenia also benefits from strong
external support, particularly in France and the US, and a homogenous ethnic
population.  Economic development has increased dramatically since the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the political instability that characterized the Lev Ter-
Petrosyyan administration has diminished (although it has not ended).  What is left
to do is for Kocharian to encourage the positive aspects of social and political
development that have surfaced in Armenia and to forgo the desire to deal with
troubles in a swift, authoritarian manner.
Conclusion
Suggesting that the states of Central Asia adopt models of government that are not
completely democratic may not be the most popular idea in a post-communist world,
but it is in fact what is needed in the region.  The historical experiences of the
peoples of Eurasia do not lend themselves to the development of democratic
institutions that are capable of functioning for the benefit of the citizens of the
region.  However, by suggesting a model of government that is not inherently
democratic does not mean that democracy will not develop in Central Asia.  It
simply means that it will take time to foster the growth of systems of government
that are responsive to the people and not the tools of the authoritarian elite.  The
Kemalist model can work in Central Asia, if it is applied carefully and if its growth
is monitored closely.  While after the death of Atatürk the model fell into misuse in
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Turkey, this need not be the case in the states of Eurasia.  And as with Turkey,
change will take time, but democracy eventually can flourish in a region that is not
yet ready for democracy (Lane, 2002).
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